Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc., dba Safe Havens for Learning, a Utah nonprofit corporation v. The State of Utah, a governmental entity; Olene Walker, in her official capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Utah; and Mark Shurtleff, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah : Brief of Appellees by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2003
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc.,
dba Safe Havens for Learning, a Utah nonprofit
corporation v. The State of Utah, a governmental
entity; Olene Walker, in her official capacity as
Lieutenant Governor of the State of Utah; and
Mark Shurtleff, in his official capacity as Attorney
General of the State of Utah : Brief of Appellees
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thom D. Roberts; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel
for Defendants/Appellees.
John A. Pearce; Ryan M. Harris; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook amd McDonough; Lisa Watts Baskin;
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. dba Safe Havens for Learning, a Utah nonprofit corporation v. The State
of Utah, a governmental entity; Olene Walker in her official capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Utah; and Mark Shurtleff, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah: Brief of Appellees, No. 20030563.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2424
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH SAFE TO LEARN - SAFE TO 
WORSHIP COALITION, INC., dba SAFE 
HAVENS FOR LEARNING, a Utah non-
profit corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, a governmental 
entity; OLENE WALKER, in her official 
capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State 
of Utah; and MARK SHURTLEFF, in his 
official capacity as Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants/Appel lees. 
Case No. 20030563 
District Court Case No. 030909591 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
THOM D. ROBERTS (#2773) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees 
John A. Pearce 
Ryan M. Harris 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 S Main St, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1644 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Lisa Watts Baskin 
819 East Springwood Drive 
North Salt Lake, UT 84054 FILED 
Telephone: (801) 292-5743 UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SEP 0 5 2003 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
U.ERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH SAFE TO LEARN - SAFE TO 
WORSHIP COALITION, INC., dba SAFE 
HAVENS FOR LEARNING, a Utah non-
profit corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Vo. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, a governmental 
entity; OLENE WALKER, in her official 
capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State 
of Utah; and MARK SHURTLEFF, in his 
official capacity as Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20030563 
District Court Case No. 030909591 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
THOM D. ROBERTS (#2773) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
John A. Pearce 
Ryan M. Harris 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 S Main St, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1644 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Lisa Watts Baskin 
819 East Springwood Drive 
North Salt Lake, UT 84054 
Telephone: (801) 292-5743 
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
•!iLbU< CONTENTS 
TABI 1 M LuNlENLS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
i .\ll'MI'Mi ' " i i'i I'NSHI'S I'KI'SI'N I ID LOR REVIEW I 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
THE INITIAT'VF p i?nn , 4 
: • • - 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . 9 
ARGUMENT 
I THE DISTRICT COURT CORKbC 1L Y i iELD THAT SOME 
BUT NOT ALL OF THE 2003 AMENDMENTS APPLY 1« > 
PLAINTIFF'S INITIATIVE " 
n THE DISTRICT COUR~ PROPERLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S CI AIMS AGAINST STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS THA'i \V wr»T M) ENFORCED 
AGAINST IT. . . i4 
III PLAIN, t A N N u i SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF A 
FACIAL CHALLENGE TO THE INITIATIVE 
PROVISIONS 17 
IV GALLIVAN V. WALKER WAS DECIDED UNDER IHE 
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE 
UTAH CONSTTTTITTON 22 
V S P KuilN'x IS NOT REQUIRED OR 
i 
APPROPRIATE 25 
VI PLAINTIFF'S SPEECH RIGHTS ARE NOT INFRINGED BY 
THE CHALLENGED INITIATIVE PROVISION 30 
VII THE SENATE DISTRICT REQUIREMENT IS A NON-
DISCRIMINATORY, REGULATORY ELECTION 
REQUIREMENT WHICH SHOULD BE UPHELD 35 
VIII THE ONE-YEAR REQUIREMENT IS A NON-
DISCRIMINATORY, REGULATORY ELECTION 
REGULATION WHICH SHOULD BE UPHELD 38 
IX THE SIGNATURE REMOVAL PROVISION IS A NON-
DISCRIMINATORY, REGULATORY ELECTION 
PROVISION THAT DOES NOT DENY OR BURDEN ANY 
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
40 
X SEVERABILITY 42 
CONCLUSION 44 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 46 
ADDENDUM 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. v. Meyer, 
120F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997) 39 
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767(1974) 20 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 
75 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1983) 27, 28 
Brady v. Ohman, 153 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1998) 34 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 
525 U.S. 182 (1999) 32, 39 
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S. Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d (1972) 27 
Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) 24 
Debrovolnyv. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1997) 21,41 
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 
394 U.S. 802 89 S. Ct. 1404, 22 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1969) 27 
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) 31,32 
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 112 S. Ct. 698, 
116 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1992) 28 
Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 
980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1993) 32 
Save Pallisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204 
(10th Cir. 2002) 31 
Skrzypczakv. Kauger,92F.3d 1050 (10thCir. 1996) 33, 34 
Washington v. Finley, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1991) 
cert denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982) 33 iii 
STATE CASES 
Bairdv. State, 475 P.2d713 (Utah 1978) 15, 16, 17 
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993) 15 
Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) 26 
Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 13 
Huntv. Owens, 596 P.2d at 1042 14 
Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) 13 
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
2001 UT 25, % 10,21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001) 1 
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) 9, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 29, 35, 37, 38, 42, 44 
Halgren v. Welling, 63 P.2d 550 (Utah 1936) 40 
Jenkins v. Swan, 615 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) 15 
Kourisv. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003UT19,^f5 1,2 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 572, 582-83 23, 34, 25, 26, 36 
Malan, 693 P.2d at 670-75 31 26 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp, 
752 P.2d at 888 26 
Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660 (1994) 12, 13, 38 
State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854 18, 38, 39, 41 
Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 
885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994) 42, 44 
Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 373 
iv 
(Utah 1998) 38 
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949) 42 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, article VI §1 4, 43 
Utah Constitution article XI § 1(2) 6 
Utah Constitution, article VI, § 2 38 
Utah Code §§ 20A-7-101-212 4 
Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)0) 1 
Utah Code § 20A-7-101 4 
Utah Code § 20A-7-202 
Utah Code § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) 2 
Utah Code § 20A-7-202(4) 5, 13 
Utah Code § 20A-7-202(4)(a) 2 
Utah Code § 20A-7-202(5) 5 
Utah Code § 20A-7-202(5)(d) 2 
Utah Code § 20A-7-203 5 
Utah Code § 20A-7-204.1 2 
Utah Code § 20A-7-205(3) 2, 18 
Utah Code § 20A-7-206 5, 12 
Utah Code § 20A-7-206(3) 5, 40 
Utah Code § 20A-7-207 5, 12 
v 
Utah Code Section 20A-7-209 6, 16 
Utah Code Section 20A-7-702(9) 6 
Utah Code Section 20A-7-703-706 6 
Utah Code § 67-lA-2(l)(2) 16 
Utah Code § 78-33-1 14, 15 
Utah Code § 78-33-2 14, 16 
VI 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Two rulings of the district court are being reviewed by this appeal: 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss (Justiciability) on the basis that there was no 
justiciable controversy with respect to two provisions of Utah's 
initiative statutes that will not be applied to Plaintiffs initiative. 
Defendants' motion challenged the jurisdiction and authority of the Court under 
declaratory judgment action, and such was grounded in Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This Court reviews the district court's decision de novo. Franco v. 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints. 2001 UT 25, If 10, 21 P3d 198 (Utah 
2001). This issue was preserved in the trial court by order on Defendants' motion. See 
R. at 311-13 (Defendants' Motion); id. at 326-36 (Plaintiffs opposition memorandum); 
id- at 411-17 (Defendants' reply memorandum); id- at 499-504 (ruling). 
2. Whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in granting Defendants' Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment concerning Plaintiffs claim of 
unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol 
2003 UT 19, t 5. 70 P.3d 72. On appeal, "[t]he trial court's resolution of the legal issues 
[presented in a summary judgment motion] is accorded no deference since entitlement to 
summary judgment is a question of law." Kouris, 2003 UT 19, ^|5. These issues were 
preserved in the trial court. R. at 36-39 (Plaintiffs motion); id. at 370-410 (Defendants' 
opposition); id- at 337-39 (Defendants' cross-motion); id- at 434-97 (Plaintiffs reply 
memorandum); id. at 499-504 (ruling). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of five provisions of Utah's Election Code 
which are set forth in full in the Addendum: 
L Utah Code § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii), which requires that sponsors of citizen 
initiatives obtain signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast for 
governor in 26 of Utah's 29 Senate districts ("the Senate District 
Requirement); 
2. Utah Code § 20A-7-202(4)(a), which requires sponsors of citizen initiatives 
to qualify their petition for the general election ballot "no later than one 
year after the application is filed" (the One-Year Requirement); 
3. Utah Code § 20A-7-202(5)(d), which requires the Lieutenant Governor to 
not approve for circulation any citizen initiative that is "identical or 
substantially similar to" any initiative submitted to the Lieutenant Governor 
for certification within the last two years ("the Same-or-Similar Ban"); 
4. Utah Code § 20A-7-204.1, which requires sponsors of citizen initiative to 
notice, hold, and document "at least seven public hearings throughout Utah" 
in various specific locations, before circulating the initiative for signatures 
("the Public Meetings Requirement"); and 
5. Utah Code § 20A-7-205(3), which allows signers of citizen initiative 
petitions to remove their names from the petitions after the petitions have 
been submitted to the county clerks ("the Signature Removal Provisions"). 
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The following constitutional provisions are of central importance to the appeal and 
are set forth in full in the Addendum: 
L Article XI, § 1 of the Utah Constitution, concerning legislative power and 
initiatives; 
2. Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, providing that uail laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operation;" 
3. Article I, § 15 of the Utah Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of speech 
and the press; 
4. the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which 
guarantee freedom of speech, political expression, due process, and equal 
protection of the law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed this action on April 30, 2003, seeking declaratory relief that either 
the amendments to Utah's Election Code adopted by the 2003 Legislature in SB 28 could 
not be applied to Plaintiffs initiative, filed before the new provisions took effect, or in 
the alternative that five provisions of the election code were facially unconstitutional 
pursuant to the state and federal constitutions. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 5, 2003. Defendants 
opposed Plaintiffs motion and filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, 
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability), seeking dismissal of the challenge 
to two of the election provisions on the basis that there was no justiciable controversy as 
they were not being applied to Plaintiffs initiative. The parties filed various affidavits, 
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stipulations regarding evidence, and took the depositions of two directors of previous 
Utah initiative campaigns. 
Motions came before the district court for hearing on June 16, 2003. The district 
court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability) and Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On June 30, 2003, the district court entered a Final Order and Judgment. On July 2, 2003, 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal. 
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 
An initiative is a new law proposed for adoption by a vote of the people; a 
referendum is a law passed by the legislature that is being submitted to the voters for their 
approval or rejection. Utah Code § 20A-7-101. Initiatives and referendums are provided 
for in the Utah Constitution, article VI §1, and procedures for statewide initiatives are set 
forth in statute in Utah Code §§ 20A-7-101-212. There are in essence four steps to the 
process. 
First is the application and initial review process. An application to circulate an 
initiative petition must be filed with the Lieutenant Governor by at least five sponsors and 
provide certain types of information. Utah Code § 20A-7-202. The Lieutenant 
Governor's review is limited, and she shall reject the application and not approve it for 
circulation only if the law proposed is patently unconstitutional, is nonsensical, could not 
become a law passed, or, as per a provision added by SB 28 in 2003, the law is identical 
or substantially similar to a law proposed by an initiative that is submitted to the county 
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clerks and Lieutenant Governor for certification within two years proceeding. § 20A-7-
202(5). If not rejected, the Lieutenant Governor approves the initiative for circulation 
and provides official numbered initiative packets for circulation. Sections 20A-7-202 and 
4. 
The second step is the circulation of the initiative packets which is the seeking of 
signatures of registered voters. A provision added by SB 28 in 2003 requires, before 
circulating initiative petitions, that sponsors must hold at least seven public hearings 
throughout Utah. Utah Code § 20A-7-204.1. The sponsors then circulate the petitions 
obtaining signatures of voters and file various reports. Section 20A-7-203, 5 and 5.5. 
The third step is the qualification of the initiative. Sponsors must submit the 
signed initiative petitions to the county clerks who determine if the circulators were Utah 
residents and at least 18 years of age and check the names of the signers to determine 
whether they were registered voters. Utah Code § 20A-7-206. The county clerk certifies 
the number of registered voters that have signed the initiative petition to the Lieutenant 
Governor. Section 20A-7-206(3). The Lieutenant Governor evaluates the number of 
signatures certified by the clerks and determines whether there were sufficient signatures 
obtained. Section 20A-7-207. She would also determine whether the petition was timely 
qualified, i.e., within one year after the application. Section 20A-7-202(4). 
The final step, assuming an initiative is qualified, is the preparation and placement 
of the initiative on the ballot. The Lieutenant Governor certifies to the office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel the proposed laws that have qualified, which 
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office will prepare a number and a ballot title. Utah Code Section 20A-7-209. The 
Lieutenant Governor also requests that the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel prepare an impartial analysis, receives arguments in favor and opposed to the 
measure from proponents and opponents of the initiative, and prints that in the voter 
information pamphlet. Sections 20A-7-702(g) and 20A-7-703-706. 
An initiative on a ballot will pass by majority vote unless it concerns the taking of 
wildlife, which requires a two-thirds approval. Utah Constitution article XI § 1(2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. That Plaintiffs claim of difficulties in its prior efforts to obtain signatures 
were that they could not get sufficient signatures in "rural Utah" because "the population 
is more spread out and diffused and it is difficult to find places where large number of 
people gather." Affidavits of Marah Carabello and Paula M. Plant, Plaintiffs Exhibits, 
R. at 280-1, 121-5. 
2. That 88.2% of Utah's population resides in urban areas and urban clusters. 
Stipulation, Governmental Information. R. at 345. 
3. That in individual counties, most of the population is clustered and centered 
in cities and towns, which are identifiable. Stipulation, Governmental Information. R. at 
345. 
4. That the state senatorial districts are created based upon population and are 
equally divided based thereon throughout the State. Stipulation, Governmental 
Information. R. at 349-50. 
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5, Concerning the Utah Property Protection Act Initiative, sponsors obtained 
the signatures required statewide and in each of the 29 counties and did so in a three-
month circulation period; that it would have qualified for 26 of 29 senate districts, and 
that it was adopted at the general election. Stipulation, Utah Property Protection Act. R. 
at 418-70. 
6. Concerning the Utah Property Protection Act Initiative, that individuals 
were happy to sign the initiative petition, that the sponsors set out to obtain the required 
signatures in each of the 29 counties, that the sponsors could have obtained more 
signatures if they had wanted to spend the additional time and/or money to gather them, 
the sponsors decided that when the campaign for signatures would start and stop based 
upon financial and political factors, and that a one-year limitation was not a burden or 
concern. Deposition of John Michael, R. at 480, pages 21, 28-30, 39-40. 
1. Concerning the English as the Official Language Initiative, that it qualified 
in 22 of 29 counties in two three-month campaigns, which was the goal that the sponsors 
set; that if 184 additional qualified signatures had been obtained, it would have qualified 
in 26 of 29 counties, and 4,179 additional signatures would have qualified it in all of 29 
counties; and that it was adopted at the ballot. Stipulation, English as the Official 
Language initiative. R. at 424-6. 
8. Concerning English as the Official Language Initiative, that people were 
happy to sign the initiative, that the sponsors set as a goal to obtain sufficient signatures 
in 22 of 29 counties, that the sponsors could have obtained additional signatures if they 
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each wanted to spend the time and/or money to obtain them, and that the sponsors decided 
when the campaign for signatures would start and stop based upon financial and political 
factors. Deposition of Richard Arnold, R. at 469, pages 14, 19-24, 31-32; Deposition of 
John Michael, R. at 480, pages 21, 28-30, 29-40. 
9. Concerning the Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act Initiative, that the 
sponsors spent six weeks gathering signatures, that they thought they had sufficient 
signatures to qualify it in 26 of 29 counties, which was their goal, but because of the 
campaign to remove signatures and non-registered voter signatures it ultimately qualified 
in only 14 of 29 counties; that if 147 signatures in strategic counties had been obtained 
and qualified that it would have qualified in 20 counties; that an additional 1,861 
qualified signatures strategically placed would have qualified in all 29 counties. 
Stipulation, Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act. R. at 421-3. 
10. Concerning the Radioactive Waste Initiative, individuals were happy to sign 
the initiative petition, that the sponsors could have obtained additional signatures if they 
wanted to spend the time and/or money to do so, and a one year limitation in getting the 
signature was no burden or concern; that the sponsors made the decisions as to when the 
campaigns for signatures would start and stop based upon financial considerations and 
political factors as to when they wanted to have the matter placed on the ballot. 
Depositions of Richard Arnold, R. at 469, pages 14,19-24, 31-2, and John Michael, R. at 
480, pages 21, 28-30, 39-40. 
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siiMM \n\ or mi \RGUMENT 
Plaintiff challenges the initiative procedures that were adopted in the 2003 
Legislative Session in SB 28. Of the numerous changes adopted in SB 28 the Lieutenant 
Governor determined that only four would apply to the Plaintiffs initiative. Plaintiff 
challenged four of the provisions of SB 28, two of which may apply to its initiative and 
two of which do not apply. 
Application of two of the challenged provisions to Plaintiffs initiative do not 
constitute the retroactive application of law. Rather, if the Lieutenant Governor makes a 
decision on the initiative, it will be in the future, and she will apply the law in effect at 
that time, which will include the two of the challenged provisions of SB 28. Concerning 
the two challenged provisions which are not being applied to Plaintiffs initiative, there is 
no justiciable controversy because they do not apply to, effect, or burden the Plaintiff 
Plaintiff has brought this action as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
initiative provisions. To sustain such a challenge, Plaintiff must show that there is no set 
of circumstances under which the statute can be valid, or, alternatively expressed, that the 
statutes are incapable of any valid application. Plaintiff has not, and cannot, sustain this 
burden with respect to these provisions. 
Plaintiff places primary reliance on this Court's case of Gallivan v. Walker. 
However, Gallivan was a uniform operation of laws case which involved a discriminatory 
classification which violated the one person/one vote principle and gave undue power to 
rural voters. The present case involves no such discriminatory classification nor violation 
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of the uniform operation of laws provision. Plaintiff also claims that strict scrutiny of the 
provisions is appropriate. However, strict scrutiny is neither required nor appropriate but 
rather a lesser standard of review should be applied. 
Plaintiff claims that its free speech rights are infringed by the initiative process. 
However, the provisions merely regulate the process for getting an initiative on the ballot 
and do not restrict the exercise of any of Plaintiff s free-speech rights. It can still 
circulate its petition, engage in political activity, advertise, speak out, raise funds, etc. 
The two provisions adopted in SB 28 which may be applied to Plaintiffs initiative 
are both non-discriminatory, regulatory election requirements which should be upheld. 
Neither of the Senate district requirement, nor the one-year requirement violate the 
uniform operation of laws provision or unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiff of any other 
right. Similarly, the signature removal requirement, which allows signers of initiatives to 
remove their name and not have it counted as long as they do so prior to their signature 
being certified, is a non-discriminatory, regulatory election provision that does not deny 
the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff. 
Finally, concerning severability, if the Court were to determine that the Senate 
district signature requirement is unconstitutional, the Court must determine whether any 
of the remaining statute is nonetheless unenforceable. It is the expressed intent of the 
Legislature that if that requirement is found unconstitutional, it is not severable from the 
statewide signature requirement, and therefore the entire statute should be unenforceable 
since a signature requirement is an essential part of the initiative. However, should this 
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Court hold that the initiative statute is nonetheless enforceable without the senate district 
requirement, the Court should maintain the statewide 10% signature requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT SOME 
BUT NOT ALL OF THE 2003 AMENDMENTS APPI Y TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INITIATIVE. 
Plaintiff filed its initiative with the Lieutenant Governor on March 21, 2003. By 
letter dated April 18, 2003 the Lieutenant Governor approved the initiative for 
circulation. During the 2003 Legislative Session SB 28 was passed, effective May 5, 
2003. By letter dated May 12, 2003, the Lieutenant Governor informed the Plaintiff that 
four of the provisions of SB 28 may apply to the initiative. Of those four provisions, two 
are being challenged by the Plaintiff: the "one-year requirement," that sponsors qualify 
their petition for ballot within one year after the application is filed, and the "senate 
district requirement," which requires the sponsors to obtain signatures equal to 10 percent 
of the total of all votes cast for Governor in each of 26 of Utah's 29 senate districts. 
It is Plaintiffs contention that none of the provisions of SB 28 can apply to its 
initiative since the Plaintiff filed its petition prior to the effective date of SB 28 and that 
would be an improper retroactive application of the law. It is the Defendants' position 
that the two of the challenged provisions may apply to Plaintiffs initiative because when 
future decisions are made regarding whether the initiative may be placed on the ballot that 
the governmental entities will apply the law in effect at that time, which would include 
the two provisions of SB 28. Therefore, there is no retroactive application of law. 
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This Court has previously dealt with the issue of applicability of changes in 
initiative procedures to a pending initiative. In Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660 (1994), 
Plaintiff was the sponsor of a municipal initiative. After the initiative had been filed and 
approved and had begun circulating, the law changed with regard to when a measure 
would be placed on a ballot, from the next election to the next "municipal election/' 
resulting in a one-year delay in the placing of the initiative on the ballot. This Court held 
that the new statutory provision applied, and the initiative, if and when approved, would 
be placed on the next "municipal ballot." As stated by the Court, 882 P.2d at 661: 
Petitioner urges that the law in effect when the initiative process 
commenced should govern throughout the process, unaffected by 
any change in the law during the process. We, again, find no merit 
to this contention. 
This Court noted that the Petitioner's right to an initiative election did not accrue until he 
had submitted sufficient signatures with the recorder and that the law in effect when he 
submitted the signature packets would apply and control the Recorder's decision and 
determination. 
Similarly here. If and when Plaintiff submits the signature sheets to the county 
clerks, the county clerks will determine which signatories are registered voters and 
forward that report to the Lieutenant Governor. Utah Code § 20A-7-206. When the 
Lieutenant Governor receives those initiative packets from the clerk she will count the 
number of names certified by the clerk and determine if there are sufficient signatures. 
Section 20A-7-207. She will look to law in effect at that time when she makes that 
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determination which, in the present case, would include the provisions adopted in SB 28 
that there must be sufficient signatures in each of 26 of the 29 senatorial districts. 
Further, the Lieutenant Governor will also determine whether the initiative qualified 
timely, applying law at the time she makes that decision - which here would be the 
provisions of SB 28 requiring qualifications within one year of the application, § 20A-7-
202(4). Thus, this is not a retroactive application of any law but rather the application of 
the law in effect at the time the governmental decision is made. Nor is it in derogation of 
any vested right of the Plaintiff. See Owens, supra. 
Other Utah law is in accord. In Campbell v. Stags, 596 P.2d 1037 Utah (1979), 
the issue was whether the trial court erred in allowing interest of 8% on the Plaintiffs 
special damages in the judgment, which was a remedy granted by statute after Plaintiffs 
case had been filed. This Court held that such was not a retroactive application of the 
statute: 
The statute is prospective in effect, since it applies to judgments 
rendered after the effective date of the act; it does not clearly 
express any retroactive effect to judgments entered before its 
effective date, and therefore has no such effect... Plaintiffs right 
to interest in this case was dependent upon the law in effect at the 
time the judgment was entered. 
596 P.2d at 1042. In Department of Social Services v. Higgs. 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), 
the employment grievance procedure was changed in the midst of a pending employee 
grievance; when the State sought judicial review of the Step 5 Determination, this Court 
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ruled that the law in effect at that time should apply, not the law in effect at the 
commencement of the grievance process. 
In this case the Defendants will be seeking to apply the law in effect at the time a 
governmental decision is made. Thus, if and when the Lieutenant Governor makes a 
determination whether there are sufficient signatures and whether the Plaintiffs initiative 
was qualified in a timely fashion, she should look to the law in effect at the time she 
makes that decision. That is not retroactive application of the law adopted by SB 28, but 
rather its prospective application. Further, it does not effect any vested rights of the 
Plaintiff, since the Plaintiff is not entitled to have the initiative laws stay the same during 
the entire initiative process. Hunt v. Owens, 596 P.2d at 1042. 
Therefore, this Court should uphold the district court's determination that the one-
year requirement and Senate district requirement adopted in SB 28 apply to Plaintiffs 
initiative and that such is not retroactive application of law. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS THAT ARE NOT BEING ENFORCED 
AGAINST IT. 
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code 
§ 78-33-1, et seq. That Act grants jurisdiction to the District Courts in appropriate cases 
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, § 78-33-1, including questions 
involving the construction and validity of rights under a statute, § 78-33-2. However, 
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there must be a justiciable controversy ripe for adjudication in order for the Court to have 
jurisdiction or authority under the Act. 
Plaintiff brought this action challenging four amendments adopted in the 2003 
Legislature: the "one-year requirement," "the senate district requirement," the "same or 
similar ban," which requires the Lieutenant Governor to reject and not approve an 
initiative for circulation if it is substantially similar to any initiative submitted to the 
clerks in the last two years, and the "public meetings requirement," which requires 
sponsors of initiatives to hold at least 7 public meetings throughout Utah before 
circulating an initiative for signatures. However, the Lieutenant Governor determined 
that only two of those may be applied to Plaintiffs initiative and that the "same or similar 
ban" and the "public meetings requirement" would not apply to the initiative. Based upon 
those statutory provisions not being threatened or applied to the Plaintiff, the district court 
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs challenge to those provisions. 
In Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993) the trial court dismissed 
the case because there was "no case or controversy presented which was ripe for 
adjudication." This Court affirmed, stating: 
Our cases construing the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah 
Code §§ 78-33-1 to -13 (1992), set forth the following requirements 
to sustain an action: a justiciable controversy based upon an accrued 
set of facts, an actual conflict, adverse parties, a legally protectible 
interest on the Plaintiffs part, and an issue ripe for judicial 
resolution. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) 
(citing Bairdv State. 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978)). We agree with the 
trial court that this case failed to meet those requirements. 
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As similarly but further stated in Baird v. State. 475 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978): 
To entertain an action for declaratory relief, there must be a 
justiciable controversy, for the courts do not give advisory opinions 
upon abstract questions. The use of the term "rights, status and 
other legal relations" in the declaratory judgment act (§ 78-33-2, 
U.C.A. 1953) relates to a justiciable controversy where there is an 
actual conflict between interested parties asserting adverse claims 
on an accrued state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of 
facts. 
When it is ascertained that there is no jurisdiction in the court 
because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court 
can go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action, 
and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or any other act of 
parties. 
Defendants recognize that the declaratory judgment statute is to be liberally 
construed and that the federal "case or controversy" requirements of Article III do not 
strictly apply. However, this Court has long held that justiciability and other 
jurisdictional requirements apply to declaratory judgment actions. As further stated in 
Baird v. State. 574 P.2d 715: 
In Lyonv. Bateman, this Court stated that while statutes authorizing 
courts to render declaratory relief should be liberally construed, the 
courts must, nevertheless, operate within the constitutional and 
statutory powers and duties imposed upon them. The courts are not 
a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory 
opinions. To maintain an action for declaratory relief, plaintiff must 
show that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in 
ordinary actions are present, for a judgment can be rendered only in 
a real controversy between adverse parties. 
The Lieutenant Governor, as Chief Election Officer, Utah Code § 67-lA-2(l)(2), 
and the person who determines whether initiatives have qualified for the ballot, § 20A-7-
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209, determined and stated that the "same or similar ban" and "public meetings 
requirement" will not be applied to Plaintiffs initiative because she had already approved 
the petition for circulation and it had been circulated. In the absence of any enforcement 
of those provisions, or threat of such enforcement, there is no justiciable controversy and 
the Court lacks jurisdictional authority under the declaratory judgment actions to render a 
decision. As further stated in Baird v. State, supra, 574 P.2d at 715: 
A party seeking a declaration of the constitutionality of a statute 
must have a real interest therein as against his adversary, whose 
rights and contentions must be opposition to those of the plaintiff 
A party to whom a statute is inapplicable cannot question its 
constitutionality by seeking a declaration of rights, (emphasis 
added) 
Even with a liberal interpretation of the declaratory judgment action, without a 
threat of enforcement or a claim that it applies to the Plaintiff there is no justiciable 
controversy. Plaintiffs claim that it may apply in the future, should it file another 
initiative, is of no help here. If Plaintiff files a new initiative in the future, and these 
provisions are applied to that new initiative, Plaintiff can challenge the provisions at that 
time, not now when they are not being applied to it. Therefore, the district court correctly 
dismissed Plaintiffs challenge to the same or similar ban in the public meetings 
requirement. 
IIL PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF A 
FACIAL CHALLENGE TO THE INITIATIVE PROVISIONS. 
Plaintiff brought this as a facial challenge to the one-year requirement, the senate 
district requirement, and the signature removal provisions, the last of which allows the 
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signers of initiative petitions to remove their names from petitions until they are 
submitted to the Lieutenant Governor to be counted, Utah Code §20A-7-205(3). Plaintiff 
has a substantial burden and one that is greater than in an "as applied" challenge to a 
statute. Plaintiff has not marshaled its case nor demonstrated that it has met its burden. 
As stated in State v. Herrera. 993 P.2d 854, 869: 
A statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to 
the facts of a given case. A facial challenge is the most difficult 
because it requires the challenger to 'establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.' An 
as-applied challenge, on the other hand, succeeds if the challenger 
shows that the statute was applied to him or her in an 
unconstitutional manner. 
This standard is alternatively formulated in Herrera as "Facial challenges can succeed, 
however, only if the statutes at issue are incapable of any valid application," 993 P.2d at 
867. 
The nature of a facial challenge was also noted in footnote 4 of Gallivan v. 
Walker. 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002), a case heavily relied upon by Plaintiff Gallivan 
involved a challenge to the multi-county signature requirement, requiring signatures from 
10% of the voters in each of 20 of 29 counties. This court found that non-population 
based geographical distribution requirement violative of the uniform operation of laws 
provisions of the Utah Constitution because it effectively discriminated against urban 
voters and gave registered voters of rural counties a disproportionate amount of voting 
power. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1096. This Court upheld the facial challenge "because in 
every instance and in every circumstances" that multi-county signature requirement 
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discriminated against the urban voter and violated the one person/one vote principle. 
Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1119, footnote 4. 
In the present case there is no underlying structural circumstance such that it is 
"incapable of any valid application." As Plaintiff admits at page 23 of its brief, "the 
challenged provisions do not create impermissible or suspect classifications among Utah 
citizens." Plaintiff cites to the burdens and difficulties it has experienced in attempting to 
qualify its initiatives - its inability to get sufficient signatures in the "rural counties" 
because it was "harder than they thought" and that "there are very few places where a 
large number of people gather, and the population is very spread out." Plaintiffs 
Affidavit of Mara Carabello, f^ 8. R. at 280. However, this ignores that Utah is a very 
urban state - 88% of its population is within an urban area or a cluster. In addition, a 
review of the so-called rural counties reflects that the population still reside in urban areas 
- for example, although the population of Grand County may be remote, Moab City has 
56% of the county living within its borders, with a higher percentage within Spanish 
Valley. 
Plaintiffs difficulties are not necessarily of constitutional concern. Their 
difficulties may also be due to lack of interest in the initiative, improper presentations, 
lack of funding or various other difficulties they may have brought on themselves. The 
last three initiatives that appeared on the Utah ballot, Utah Personal Property Act, the 
English as an Official Language Act, and the Radioactive Waste Initiative, which 
qualified under the prior 20 of 29 county signature requirement, show that sufficient 
19 
signatures can be gathered. The Utah Property Protection Act initiative obtained more 
signatures than necessary statewide in each of the 29 counties, and thus would have 
qualified under the new senate district requirement, and it did so in less than three 
months. English as the Official Language obtained sufficient signatures statewide and in 
22 of 29 counties after two three-month circulating campaigns. However, had the 
sponsors obtained 184 more signatures in four counties, the initiative would have 
qualified in 26 of 29 counties, and 4,176 signatures in the other three counties would have 
qualified the initiative in all 29 counties. Finally, the Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act 
Initiative obtained sufficient signatures statewide and ultimately qualified in 14 of 29 
counties, after only six weeks of circulating this petition. However, had the sponsor 
obtained 147 signatures in six counties, the initiative would have qualified in 20 of 29 
counties, and an additional 1,861 signatures in the other counties would have qualified in 
all of the 29 counties. Further, in the depositions of the circulation coordinators for those 
three initiatives, Mr. Richard Arnold and Mr. John Michael testified that people were 
happy to sign their petitions, that the one-year limitation was not an issue or burden for 
them, and that they could have obtained additional signatures if they had wanted to or if 
they had decided to spend the additional time and money to do so. 
Plaintiffs apparent difficulties are not sufficient to meet the burden of a facial 
challenge. In American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) the Court denied 
various challenges to the Texas election scheme concerning ballot access by minor parties 
and independents. One of the challenges involved the limitation on circulating 
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supplemental petitions to get individuals on the ballot to 55 days in order to obtain 22,000 
signatures. The Court upheld the requirement, stating at 415 U.S. 787: 
Hard work and sacrifice by dedicated volunteers are the lifeblood 
of any political organization. Constitutional adjudication and 
common sense are not at war with each other, and we are thus 
unimpressed with arguments that burdens like those imposed by 
Texas are too onerous, especially where two of the original party 
Plaintiff themselves satisfy these requirements. 
Similarly in Debrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1997), where challenge was 
made to the Nebraska initiative provisions which required signatures equal to 10% of the 
number of registered voters on the date the petition was submitted, resulting in an 
inability to know the exact number of signature necessary. The Court denied the 
constitutional challenge, stating at 1113: 
While the Nebraska provision may have made it difficult for 
appellants to plan their initiative campaign and efficiently allocate 
their resources, the difficulty of the process alone is insufficient to 
implicate the First Amendment, as long as the communication of 
ideas associated with the circulation of petitions is not affected. 
Plaintiff has failed in its burden to demonstrate that the statutory provisions are 
incapable of any valid application. There is no aspect of these provisions which, in all 
circumstances, per force constitute a violation of Plaintiff s constitutional rights, such as 
in Gallivan. Therefore, Plaintiffs facial challenge should be rejected and the district 
court's ruling upheld. 
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IV. GALLIVAN V. WALKER WAS DECIDED UNDER THE 
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) struck down the then-existing 
multi-county signature requirement for statewide initiatives on the basis that it violated 
the Utah constitutional provisions regarding the uniform operations of laws. See f^ 64, 54 
P.3d at 1096. This Court's review was under the uniform operation of laws provisions, 
analyzing the discriminatory classification created by the signature requirements of 10% 
of the voters in each of 20 of 29 counties, which were not population based, violated the 
one person/one vote paradigm, and which discriminated between urban and rural voters 
and gave extra weight and power to rural voters and counties. See [^s 44 and 45, 54 P.3d 
at 1086-7. This Court's analysis with regard to burdens and effects of the multi-county 
signature requirement was under the uniform operation of laws analysis concerning its 
discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs reliance on Gallivan is misplaced as there is no similar 
discriminatory classification here. 
This Court's holding and analysis of its decision in Gallivan were summed up in 
164, 54 P.3d at 1096, as follows: 
The multi-county signature requirement effectively discriminates 
against urban voters in that it affords the registered voters of rural 
counties a disproportionate amount of voting power. The multi-
county signature requirement's discriminatory classification is 
unconstitutional under the uniform operation of laws provision of 
the Utah Constitution because it is not reasonably necessary to 
further, and does not in fact actually and substantially further, any 
of the proffered legislative purposes. We therefore hold that the 
requirement constitutes a violation of the Utah Constitution and 
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note that the result in this case is explicitly premised on that 
holding. 
The problem in Gallivan was that the signature requirement of 10% of the voters in each 
of 20 of 29 counties created two classes - rural and urban counties and voters, and treated 
them differently. In the present case, there is no such discriminatory classification 
created. Sponsors of initiatives are required to obtain signatures in 26 of 29 senate 
districts with equal populations. Here there is no discriminatory treatment as there was 
with the county requirement - each district is population based and there is no rural/urban 
classification or effect. Similarly, the "one year requirement" requiring initiatives to 
qualify within one year creates no classifications that are discriminatory and does not 
raise the concerns reflected in Gallivan or the uniform operation of laws analysis. 
This Court's discussions in Gallivan with regard to the purposes of the multi-
county signature requirement, whether those purposes were furthered by the provision, 
and the burdens of that requirement were part of its analysis under the uniform operation 
of laws provisions, not as an independent constitutional violation. This Court first 
determined that the multi-county signature requirement affected fundamental and critical 
rights and thus its review utilized heightened scrutiny while following the analytical 
model of Lee v. Gaufin, 67 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993). Under that analytical model a statutory 
classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected fundamental 
or critical right is constitutional only if it is reasonable, has more than a speculative 
tendency to further the legislative objective and in fact and substantially furthers the valid 
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legislative purpose, and is reasonably necessary to further the legitimate legislative goal. 
Gallivan, |^ 42, 54 P.3d at 1086. This Court went through the preliminary analysis in ^ s 
43-45 determining that the statute created classifications which were discrimination and 
then stated, in ^ 46, 54 P.3d at 1087: 
Having determined that a discriminatory classification and disparate 
impact exists, we now must consider if that discriminatory 
classification is constitutionally permissible under the uniform 
operation of laws provision. To make this determination, we turn 
to Lees' analytical model. See 867 P.2d at 582-83. 
This Court then proceeded to analyze what the proffered legislative purposes were, 
whether those legislative purposes were valid, whether the multi-county requirement had 
more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective, and whether it was 
reasonably necessary to further the legislative purpose. 
This Court in Gallivan did not hold that any initiative requirement that burdens the 
ability to place an initiative on the ballot is unconstitutional or calls for strict scrutiny. 
Courts have recognized that election laws, by their very nature, impose a burden on 
individual voters, candidates and initiatives. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428. 433 
(1992). This Court in Gallivan also recognized that the Legislature may impose 
restrictions which may not only be a burden on the initiative process but might make it 
more difficult for an initiative to be on the ballot. See Gallivan, f^ 54, 54 P.3d at 1088-9. 
This Court's discussion of the impropriety of over-burdening the initiative process came 
in its discussion of what is a legitimate legislative purpose in the context of its uniform 
operation of laws analysis: 
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The Legislature may not, however, impose discriminatory 
restrictions on the initiative right by making it "not so easy" to get 
initiatives on the ballot simply for the sake of making it harder to do 
so and restricting the initiative power. Thus, the multi-county 
signature requirement does not pass the uniform operation of laws 
constitutional hurdle in this respect either because even if we 
assume that the multi-county signature requirement is reasonably 
necessary to further, and in fact actually and substantially furthers, 
the legislative purpose of making it harder to get initiatives on the 
ballot, that legislative purpose is not legitimate. 
H 53, 54 P.3d at 1088-9 (emphasis added). 
It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiffs reliance upon Gallivan is misplaced. 
Gallivan was a uniform operation of laws case involving a discriminatory classification 
which was contrary to the one person/one vote paradigm. Plaintiff recognizes that the 
challenged provisions do not create impermissible or suspect classifications. Brief of 
Plaintiff, page 23. The language and analysis of Gallivan regarding burdens and effects 
on the initiative process, were in the context of the uniform operation of law analysis 
under Lee, supra. 
V. STRICT SCRUTINY IS NOT REQUIRED OR APPROPRIATE. 
Plaintiff claims that the challenged law should be analyzed under the strictest of 
scrutinies without any presumption of constitutionality. Such a level of scrutiny is not 
required by state nor federal law, will unduly interfere with Legislative authority to 
establish the procedures for initiatives, and will cause tremendous turmoil in election law 
requirements. 
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The uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution is in Article I, 
Section 24, which states, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." In 
Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989), this Court set forth the 
methodology and analysis under that provision: 
In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I, § 24, we must 
determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the 
objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there 
is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the 
legislative purposes. 752 P.2d at 890; see Malan, 693 P.2d at 670-
75 . . . It is also important to note that although the broad outlines 
of the analytic model used in determining compliance with the 
uniform operation of laws provision remain the same in all cases, 
the level of scrutiny we give legislative enactment varies. See, e.g. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp, 752 P2d at 
888, and; Condemarin v. University Hospital 775 P.2d 348, 107 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 9-11 (Opinions of Durham and Stewart, J.J.). 
Broad deference is given to non-discriminatory classifications which will be upheld if 
"facts can reasonably be conceived which would justify the distinction or differences in 
state policy [expressed by the challenged legislation] as between different persons." Blue 
Shield, supra, 779 P.2d at 637. Classifications that discriminate against constitutionally 
protected rights are scrutinized more carefully and are upheld if it is "(1) reasonable, (2) 
has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, 
actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably 
necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Lee, supra, 867 P.2d at 583. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in election and initiative cases has adopted a varying 
level of scrutiny based upon the nature of the restriction, what rights are being restricted, 
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and the severity of that restriction. In Burdick v. Takushi, supra, the Court upheld 
Hawaii's prohibition of write-in voting. The Court reviewed the nature of election laws 
and challenges to them, the Court's precedents and experience in dealing with such 
challenges, and held that the level of analysis must vary depending upon the 
circumstances: 
Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual 
voters. Each provision of a code, 'whether it governs the 
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility 
of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects - at 
least to some degree - the individual's right to vote and his right to 
associate with others for political ends.' Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569-1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 
(1983). Consequently, to subject every voting regulation to strict 
scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie 
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated 
equitably and efficiently. See Brief for Petitioner 32-37. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that a State's system 'creates barriers . 
•. tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might 
choose . . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' Bullock v. 
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856 31 L.Ed.2d (1972); 
Anderson, supra, 460 U.S., at 788, 103 S.Ct. At 1569-1570; 
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago. 394 U.S. 802 
89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). 
Instead, as the full Court agreed in Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-789, 
103 S.Ct. at 1569-1570; id at 808, 817, 103 S.Ct. at 1580, 1584-
1585. (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), a more flexible standard 
applies. A court considering a challenge to a state election law must 
weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate' against 'the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its 
rule,' taking into consideration 'the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.' Id. at 789, 103 
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S.Ct. at 1570; Tashiian. supra, 479 U.S. at 213-214, 107 S.Ct. at 
547-548. 
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the 
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which 
a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected 
to 'severe' restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to 
advance a state interest of compelling importance.' Norman v. 
Reed. 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 
(1992). But when a state election law provision imposes only 
'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, 'the State's important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the 
restrictions. Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-1570; 
see also Id. 788-789, n. 9, 103 S.Ct, at 1569-1570, n. 9. 
It is respectfully submitted that it must be insufficient merely to say that an 
initiative laws "affects" the initiative process in order to subject the provision to strict 
scrutiny. Rather, the nature of the restriction and what rights are being affected must be 
scrutinized. Otherwise, Legislature's authority to establish the initiative procedures 
would be unduly restricted. The Utah constitutional provisions regarding initiatives 
provide, in article VI, § 2A(i), that the legal voters in the State may initiate any desired 
legislation "in the numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and at the time 
prescribed by statute." With such plenary authority to establish the conditions, the 
number of signatures necessary to get a matter on the ballot, and generally provide for the 
initiative procedures, to apply strict scrutiny to every aspect of initiative law severely 
limits the ability to establish any procedure. 
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Under Plaintiffs theory all restrictions and initiative provisions would be subject 
to strict scrutiny, and each would be analyzed with the same rigorousness. Thus, if the 
sponsors who filed an application for an initiative had only four sponsors rather than the 
required five, those sponsors could challenge the requirement asserting there is no 
compelling need for five as opposed to four sponsors. Sponsors of an initiative who 
obtain signatures totaling 9% of the number of signatures of the voters for Governor in 
the last election could challenge claiming that there is no compelling state interest in 
requiring 10% as opposed to 9%; or sponsors who file an initiative with the county clerks 
on June 2nd of an election year, one day late, could challenge the requirement of June 1st 
as not supported by any compelling state interest or need. 
This Court's analysis in Gallivan is not contrary. In Gallivan the discrimination 
involved the multi-county signature requirement which was a non population-based 
criteria, contrary to the one-person/one vote paradigm. Further, there was discrimination 
and disparate impact upon urban versus rural counties and voters. This Court found that 
such severely infringed the uniform operation of laws provisions and the equal rights of 
the urban voters and counties and inappropriately made rural voters and counties the gate 
keeper of initiatives. This, the Court found, was sufficient to require the strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
In the present case, we do not have such a circumstance. The Plaintiff is 
challenging a non-discriminatory, regulatory election provisions designed to ensure a 
modicum of support throughout the Utah population and that there be an orderly, known 
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and efficient process. Although Plaintiff is claiming that their free speech rights are 
being infringed, as shown below, such rights are not being infringed, let alone "severely." 
Finally, there is no claim of any content-based restrictions or difficulties based upon any 
aspect of Plaintiff or its initiative. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that strict scrutiny analysis in this case is not 
mandated nor warranted. This Court should reaffirm its prior holdings that the level of 
scrutiny under such constitutional challenges varies depending upon the circumstances, 
the rights involved, and the impact on those rights. 
VI. PLAINTIFF'S SPEECH RIGHTS ARE NOT INFRINGED BY 
THE CHALLENGED INITIATIVE PROVISION. 
Plaintiff claims that the initiative provisions which it challenges, the "one-year 
requirement," the "senate district requirement" and the "signature removal provision" 
infringes its "core political speech" rights that are protected under the federal and state 
constitutions. It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff misunderstands the nature of free 
speech rights as these initiative provisions do not restrict or burden Plaintiffs free speech 
rights at all, let alone severely infringe them. Plaintiff is free to initiate and circulate 
petitions, engage in political discussions, raise money, campaign and otherwise engage in 
all political and speech endeavors. The challenged provisions do not restrict the exercise 
of any of the Plaintiffs free speech rights, they only set up the process to place an 
initiative on the ballot. 
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The free speech rights of individuals are of fundamental importance to our society 
and are at the core of the political process. As stated by the Supreme Court in Meyer v. 
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988): 
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the 
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or 
fear of subsequent punishment. The First Amendment was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people. 
Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; 
their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for 
that change is guarded by the First Amendment. (Internal quotes 
and citations omitted.) 
However, not every regulation of the initiative process effects or impacts the free-speech 
rights of individuals. In Save Pallisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) 
the Tenth Circuit noted that free speech rights may be implicated by attempts to regulate 
initiatives but need not be: 
In other words, the right to free speech and the right to vote are not 
implicated by the state's creation of an initiative procedure, but only 
by the state's attempts to regulate speech associated with an 
initiative procedure, which is not the case here. 
The U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with initiatives and free speech have noted 
this distinction between regulations which inhibit speech and those that do not. In Meyer 
v. Grant, supra, the Court struck down a prohibition on using paid circulators of initiative 
petitions. The Court held that in circulating initiative petitions the interactive 
communication concerning political change that was appropriately described as "core 
political speech." Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-3, and that the limitation on paid circulators 
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reduced the amount of speech that could be engaged in, thereby directly restricting 
political speech and requiring strict scrutiny. 
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999), the 
Court reviewed various initiative provisions, striking down some and affirming others. 
The Court thus highlighted that those restrictions that inhibit free speech may be 
unconstitutional while other initiative provisions which may restrict the initiative process 
but do not inhibit speech do not violate free speech rights. Buckley struck down the 
requirements that initiative circulators be registered voters, that they wear an 
identification badge bearing the circulator's name, and that the names and addresses and 
amount paid to each individual circulator be reported on the basis that each of those 
requirements "produces a speech diminution of the very kind produced by the ban on paid 
circulators at issue in Meyer." 525 U.S. at 194. However, the Court upheld requiring 
circulators be 18 years of age or older, the six-month limit on seeking signatures, and that 
each circulator attach to the petition an affidavit that they understood the laws governing 
the circulation of petitions. These latter provisions, since they did not restrict the amount 
of speech or ability to speak, did not infringe free speech rights, were not subject to strict 
scrutiny, and were determined to be constitutional, even though they impacted and 
burdened the initiative process and made it harder for an initiative to get on the ballot. 
Other cases have similarly highlighted the distinction between speech restrictions 
and other burdens of the initiative or election process. In Republican Party of North 
Carolina v. Martin. 980 R2d 943 (4th Cir. 1993) the Republican Party argued that the 
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statewide method of electing judges prevented them from fully and effectively 
participating in the political process, chilling the desire of Republicans to engage in 
vigorous debate and to seek judgeships, and constituted a defacto requirement of political 
affiliation with the Democratic party in order to become a judge. The Court rejected their 
claims stating, at page 960: 
The North Carolina method of election for superior court judges 
does not entail direct impediments prohibited by the First 
Amendment. Unlike the complainants in the ballot access cases, 
Republicans in North Carolina may run for superior court 
judgeships, vote for the candidate of their choice, and associate 
together in support of their chosen candidate. Although the North 
Carolina method of election of superior court judges does prevent 
the realization of Republican political goals, Republicans are not 
prevented from participating, as individuals or as a group, in the 
election of superior court judges. The First Amendment guarantees 
the right to participate in the political process. It does not guarantee 
political success. 
(emphasis added). Similarly in Washington v. Finlev, 664 F.2d 913, 927-8 (4th Cir. 1991) 
cert denied 457 U.S. 1120 (1982): 
The First Amendment's protection of the freedom of association 
and of the rights to run for office, have one's name on the ballot, 
and present one's views to the electorate do not also include 
entitlement to success in those endeavors. The carefully guarded 
right to expression does not carry with it any right to be listened to, 
believed or supported in one's views. 
(Emphasis added) And in Skrzvpczak v. Kauger. 92 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1996) the Tenth 
Circuit upheld, against a free speech claim, court review of proposed initiatives which 
had the effect of keeping the Plaintiffs initiative off of the ballot. In dismissing the free 
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speech claim, the Court noted the Plaintiff misunderstood her free speech rights to 
include having her initiative on the ballot, 92 F.3d at 1053: 
Skrzypczak mistakenly conflates her legally-protected interest in 
free speech with her personal desire to have [the initiative] on the 
ballot. In removing [the initiative] from the ballot, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court has not prevent from Skrypzak from speaking on 
any subject. She is free to argue against legalized abortion, to 
contend that pre-submission content review of initiative petitions is 
unconstitutional, or to speak publicly on any other issue. Her right 
to free speech in no way depends on the presence of [the initiative] 
on the ballot. 
Similarly here. The Plaintiff is confusing being successful in circulating its 
petition and getting sufficient signatures in a timely fashion - i.e. to be successful in its 
political efforts - with its free speech rights. The challenged restrictions do not in any 
way inhibit or limit the exercise of the Plaintiffs speech rights, even if the restrictions 
make it "harder" rather than "easier" to succeed in the initiative process. Brady v. 
Ohman, 153 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1998). The initiative provisions do not restrict the 
Plaintiff in the exercise of any speech rights - it is free to discuss, urge, circulate 
petitions, and otherwise engage in all its speech rights and political activity. 
Since the challenged initiative provisions do not restrict or limit free speech rights, 
there is no state or federal free speech violation. This Court should affirm the district 
court's denial of Plaintiff s free speech claim. 
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VII. THE SENATE DISTRICT REQUIREMENT IS A NON-
DISCRIMINATORY, REGULATORY ELECTION 
REQUIREMENT WHICH SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
In the 2003 Legislative Session, the Legislature adopted SB 28, Initiative 
Amendments largely as a result of the Gallivan decision. The Gallivan decision struck 
down as unconstitutional the multi-county signature requirement - that sponsors obtain 
signatures equal to 10% of the number of votes for governor in the previous election in 
each of 20 of the 29 counties. Since the inception of initiatives in Utah, the Legislature 
has required the multi-county signature requirement in addition to the requirement of 
signatures statewide equal to 10% of the voters in the last gubernatorial election. In SB 
28 they substituted the requirement of signatures to equal 10% of the votes for Governor 
in the previous election in each of 26 of 29 population-based, evenly divided senate 
districts. Plaintiff challenged this as an unconstitutional requirement. 
This court in Gallivan struck down the multi-county signature requirement as a 
discriminatory classification not reasonably necessarily to further a legitimate legislative 
The multi-county signature requirement is not a reasonably 
necessary means or mechanism to further the legislative purpose of 
ensuring broad geographic statewide support because it invidiously 
discriminates against urban registered voters in favor of rural 
registered voters in violation of the one person, one vote principle 
and overly burdens the constitutional right of initiative in that it is 
not the least restrictive means of furthering the stated legislative 
purpose. The multi-county signature reqruiements's use of counties 
as the geographic unit of distribution is the source of the invidious 
discrimination. Because counties have such widely varied 
populations, with the concentration of population being in 4 
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counties, the multi-county signature requirement's reliance on 
counties and the effect of its requiring signatures from 20 of 29 
counties result in the discrimination in favor of the 25 rural counties 
over the 4 urban counties. It is not inconceivable that a less 
restrictive, burdensome, or nondiscriminatory mechanism for 
ensuring broad geographic statewide support could be crafted. 
Because the multi-county signature requirement is not a reasonably 
necessary means to further this intended legislative purpose, it does 
not pass constitutional muster under our uniform operation of laws 
provisions. See Lee, 867 P.2d at 582-83. (emphasis added) 
Paragraph 49, 54 P.3d 1087-8. The 2003 Legislature in SB 28 responded to the Court's 
statement. It sought to exercise its constitutional authority to set forth the numbers of 
signatures for an initiative to get on to the ballot, to do so in a manner that ensured that 
there was a modicum of support before the matter would appear on the ballot, and, since 
it is a statewide issue, to ensure that that support was throughout the statewide population, 
and finally to do so in a manner that was non-discriminatory and constitutional. 
Thus, the requirement now is that sponsors must obtain 10% of the number of 
voters who voted for Governor in the last election statewide and, from each of 26 of 29 
evenly divided, population-based districts, 10% of the number of voters in that district 
who voted for Governor in the previous election. This requirement tracks the one 
person/one vote principle and requires only a "modicum" of support - 10% of those who 
voted for Governor, not 10% of the registered voters. 
Plaintiffs complaint stems from having had a difficult time obtaining sufficient 
signatures to have its prior initiative placed on the ballot. Plaintiff cites to two prior 
attempts to qualify under the multi-county requirement but they could not get sufficient 
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signatures in "rural counties" because it was "harder than they thought" and that "there 
are very few places where large numbers of people gather, and the population is very 
spread out." Affidavit of Mara Carabello. R at 280-1. However, a review of the census 
figures from the stipulated census documents reflects that Utah as a very urban state -
88% of its population lives within an urban area or cluster. In addition, a review of the 
so-called rural counties reflect that the population still resides in urban areas and clusters. 
As an example, although some of the population of Grand County may be remote, if you 
go to Moab, you get 56% of the county living within that town, and more within the 
Spanish Valley. 
Plaintiffs difficulties may also not be of a "constitutional" concern. Their 
inability to obtain sufficient signatures may be due to lack of interest, improper 
presentations, lack of funding, or various other difficulties. The last three initiatives that 
appeared on the Utah ballot, the Utah Personal Property Act, the English as an Official 
Language Act, and the Radioactive Waste Initiative, although under the previous 20 of 29 
multi-county signature requirement, show that sufficient signatures can be gathered. And 
as would appear from the evidence concerning those initiatives, they could have qualified 
for the ballot under current requirements. 
The senate district requirement, adopted in response to Gallivan, sought to 
continue the long tradition of having a signature requirement over and above 10% 
statewide, in order to have a modicum of support throughout the state population in order 
for a statewide initiative to be placed on the ballot. It did so in a manner to avoid the 
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problems in Gallivan by not utilizing a non-population based method which discriminated 
between urban and rural voters and violated the one person/one vote principle. 
It is submitted that Plaintiff has failed to show, as it must in a facial challenge, that 
"no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid." State v. 
Herrera, supra, 993 P.2d at 869. Therefore, the district court should be affirmed in 
denying Plaintiffs challenge. 
VIIL THE ONE-YEAR REQUIREMENT IS A NON-
DISCRIMINATORY, REGULATORY ELECTION 
REGULATION WHICH SHOULD BE UPHELD, 
Plaintiff challenges the requirement adopted in SB 28 that an initiative must 
qualify within one year of filing. This was a change from the prior requirement that 
allowed up to two election cycles for an initiative to qualify. Plaintiff appears to claim 
that this provision is unconstitutional because it is more stringent and more difficult to 
comply with than the law in effect when Gallivan was decided. However, such is not the 
standard. 
Plaintiff has no right to have the law with regard to initiatives to stay the same 
during the pendency of an initiative, see Owens v. Hunt let alone anything pre-Gallivan. 
Setting a time limit on when an initiative may qualify is something the Legislature has 
been given specific constitutional authority to do. See Utah Constitution, article VI, § 2, 
and Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder. 972 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1998). 
This one-year limitation creates no discriminatory classification and is not a 
burden to the process. As shown by the prior initiatives that qualified for the ballot, 
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which spent six weeks, three months, and five months qualifying, time does not appear to 
be a concern. That was also testified to by the individuals responsible for gathering the 
signatures, Messrs. Owen and Michael - the one year limitation was not a burden or 
concern to them. 
Colorado requires its initiatives to qualify within six months. The Tenth Circuit 
Court upheld that limitation, stating: 
Defendants assert several interests: preserving the integrity of the 
state's elections, maintaining an orderly ballot, and limiting voter 
confusion. The regulation here advances these interests by 
establishing a reasonable window in which proponents must 
demonstrate support for their causes. The six-month deadline is a 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory ballot access regulation; it does not 
offend the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 
1997), affirmed as Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 
(1997). 
Defendant has not and cannot meet its burden of showing that as to this portion of 
the initiative requirements, "that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] 
would be valid/' State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 869, its burden on a facial challenge. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's denial of Plaintiff s claim and 
affirm its decision. 
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IX. THE SIGNATURE REMOVAL PROVISION IS A NON-
DISCRIMINATORY, REGULATORY ELECTION 
PROVISION THAT DOES NOT DENY OR BURDEN ANY 
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD BE UPHELD, 
Plaintiff complains that the right of an individual who has signed an initiative 
petition to subsequently remove his or her signature in some manner denies or burdens 
Plaintiffs constitutional rights. However, this is a non-discriminatory, regulatory election 
law provision which has existed in statute for over 50 years, and before that it was 
recognized as a right by this Court. Plaintiffs claims go to its idea of being successful 
rather than a demonstration of how and which rights are specifically being infringed and 
denied. 
In Halgren v. Welling, 63 P.2d 550, 556 (Utah 1936), this Court recognized that a 
person who signs a petition has a right to have their signature removed prior to it being 
acted upon: 
There is no substantial reason why a person who had once signed a 
petition may not, at any time before the petition has been acted 
upon, withdraw his name, and if timely done, his name should not 
be timely counted. 
Under the initiative process, sponsors can submit signatures at any time to the county 
clerks. The county clerks review the signatures to determine if they are signatures of 
registered voters. County clerks may submit the signatures to the Lieutenant Governor at 
any time, but later than July 1st before the regular election, and certify whether or not the 
signature is that of a registered voter. Utah Code § 20A-7-206(3). It is at that time, when 
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the clerk certifies the signature and forwards it to the Lieutenant Governor, that the 
"petition is acted upon." 
Plaintiff complains of the "apparent" unfairness of such a process because 
initiative opponents may have "up to one month of unfettered access to the initiative 
signers," during which initiative sponsors may not submit additional signatures. 
However, this ignores the fact that during this time the sponsors would have the same 
access as their opponents to these individuals and the sponsors could urge the signatories 
to not remove their signatures. In addition, up until the submittal of the signatures, the 
sponsors have had unfettered access to the individuals who they got to sign the petition. 
Further, sponsors are able and entitled to submit as many signatures as they wish. 
Plaintiff complains that sponsors must plan to gather more signatures than required so 
they can weather the removal process. However, sponsors must regularly gather more 
signatures since many signatures will not be of registered voters. Sponsors thus make a 
calculated decision as to how many signatures they think they will need in order to qualify 
a ballot and, as in all endeavors, they can be in error. However, courts have held that the 
inability to know just how many signatures one needs to gather in order to qualify for a 
petition is not of constitutional concern. See Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th 
Cir. 1997). Also, other sponsors have been able to qualify their initiatives, even with this 
provision in place. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff has not and cannot meet its burden, 
under a facial challenge, to show that the signature removal provision, including its 
41 
timing, are such that "no set of circumstances exist under which the [statute] would be 
valid," State v. Herrera, supra, 993 P.2d at 869. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
denial of Plaintiff s claim by the trial court. 
X. SEVERABILITY 
When a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional the Court must determine 
whether the remaining, constitutional portions of the statute may be enforced. The courts 
have generally held that to be a matter of legislative intent. As stated in Stewart v. Utah 
Public Service Commission. 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994), quoting from Union Trust 
Co. v. Simmons. 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949): 
Severability or separability where part of a statute is 
unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative intent. The test 
fundamentally is whether the Legislature would have passed the 
statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the parts 
are so dependent upon each other that the court should conclude the 
intention was that the statute be effective only in its entirety. 
Only the senate district signature requirement has an expressed legislative intent 
regarding severability. 
SB 28 was passed in response to the Gallivan decision. The Legislature had 
expressed disappointment that the multi-county requirement found unconstitutional in 
Gallivan was held to be severable and the remaining portion of the statute allowed to be 
enforced. The Legislature was of the view that the signature requirement, in the absence 
of the multi-county requirement, should be referred back to the Legislature to establish 
new signature requirements under its authority pursuant to the Utah Constitution, article 
42 
VI, § 1. Legislative intent, and the appropriate outcome, must be analyzed in light of 
these circumstances. 
The Legislature obviously intended that the 10% requirement statewide of 
signatures not be severable from the requirement of 10% in 26 of the 29 senate districts. 
Thus, it would appear to be the Legislative intent that should the senate district 
requirement be found unconstitutional, that it be deemed not severable from the 10% of 
the state as a whole requirement. The Plaintiff posits that the result should be that there 
would be no signature requirement, no necessity of showing any voter support at all for 
any initiative to be allowed on the ballot. Such would not comport with the intent and 
purposes of the Legislature in SB 28. 
Initiatives have always been subject to the requirement of a number of signatures 
of voters in order to be placed on the ballot. The Utah Constitution notes this - the 
"numbers" in article VI, § 2(A)(1) is a reference to the number of signatures in the 
petition drive. This requirement of a modicum of support assures that there is sufficient 
public interest to justify the costs, expenditures, burdens, and extra efforts involved if a 
statewide initiative is to be placed on the ballot. Further, without any signature 
requirement all initiatives would be placed on the ballot, clogging and encumbering the 
ballot, making it unwieldy for voters to read through and vote on each initiative on the 
ballot. Thus, the requirement of a number of signatures, being essential to the initiative 
process, would require that the initiative statute as a whole fail if no signatures are 
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required so that no initiatives could be placed on the ballot. Such would be the intent of 
the Legislature. 
If this Court were to determine that notwithstanding that intent of the Legislature, 
and based on the Legislature's duty to provide a statutory method for qualifying 
initiatives, see GalUvan, 54 P.3d at 1082, that initiatives would be allowed under the 
statute, these Defendants would suggest that the Legislative intent and purpose must still 
be looked to for guidance. Since a signature requirement is so essential to the initiative 
process, and is in fact contemplated as a constitutional requirement, the severability 
statement set forth in the provisions of SB 28 would not be in accordance with Legislative 
intent if it resulted in the absence of any signature requirement. So, if this Court were to 
find the senate district signature requirement unconstitutional, and that the other 
provisions of the initiative statute are enforceable and capable of allowing an initiative to 
be placed on the ballot, the Legislature would not have passed the severability provision 
in SB 28 effectively removing all signature requirements. Under Stewart v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, supra, and in these circumstances, the Court should not apply that 
severability provision in order to satisfy the Legislature's intent and goals and continue to 
require the 10% statewide signature requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should affirm the decision of the district 
court that only two of the 2003 amendments challenged by the Plaintiff apply to its 
initiative and that as to the two not being applied that there is no justiciable controversy 
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and the Complaint should be dismissed. The Court should also affirm the district court's 
denial of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and its subsequent granting of the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as set forth herein. 
Dated this day of September, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.) 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
ARTICLE VI 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
Section L [Power vested in Senate, House and People.] 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of the 
State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in the 
manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption 
upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote 
of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the voters of the 
State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect. 
(ii) Nothwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or prohibit 
the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be adopted upon 
approval of two-thirds of those voting. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in the 
manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county, 
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by 
statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or town 
to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or ordinance may take 
effect. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press - Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. In all 
criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good 
motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to 
determine the law and the fact. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ARTICLE VI 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House and People.] 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of the 
State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in the 
manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption 
upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote 
of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the voters of the 
State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or prohibit 
the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be adopted upon 
approval of two-thirds of those voting. 
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(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in the 
manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county, 
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by 
statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or town 
to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or ordinance may take 
effect. 
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TITLE 20A 
ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7 
ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 2 
STATEWIDE INITIATIVES 
20A-7-201. Statewide initiatives - Signature requirements - Submission to the 
Legislature or to a vote of the people, 
(1) (a) A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to the Legislature for approval or 
rejection shall obtain: 
(i) legal signatures equal to 5% of the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for 
governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected; and 
(ii) from each of at least 26 Utah State Senate districts, legal signatures equal to 5% of the 
total of all votes cast in that district for all candidates for governor at the last regular general 
election at which a governor was elected. 
(b) If, at any time not less than ten days before the beginning of an annual general session of 
the Legislature, the lieutenant governor declares sufficient any initiative petition that is signed by 
enough voters to meet the requirements of this Subsection (1), the lieutenant governor shall 
deliver a copy of the petition and the cover sheet required by Subsection (l)(c) to the president of 
the Senate, the speaker of the House, and the director of the Office of Legislative Research and 
General Counsel. 
(c) In delivering a copy of the petition, the lieutenant governor shall include a cover sheet that 
contains: 
(i) the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for governor at the last regular 
general election at which a governor was elected; 
(ii) the total of all votes cast in each Utah State Senate district for all candidates for governor 
at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected; 
(iii) the total number of certified signatures received for the submitted initiative; and 
(iv) the total number of certified signatures received from each Utah State Senate district for 
the submitted initiative. 
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(2) (a) A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a vote of the people for approval 
or rejection shall obtain: 
(i) legal signatures equal to 10% of the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for 
governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected; and 
(ii) from each of at least 26 Utah State Senate districts, legal signatures equal to 10% of the 
total of all votes cast in that district for all candidates for governor at the last regular general 
election at which a governor was elected. 
(b) If, at any time not less than four months before any regular general election, the lieutenant 
governor declares sufficient any initiative petition that is signed by enough legal voters to meet 
the requirements of this subsection, the lieutenant governor shall submit the proposed law to a 
vote of the people at the next regular general election. 
(3) The lieutenant governor shall provide the following information from the official canvass 
of the last regular general election at which a governor was elected to any interested person: 
(a) the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for governor; and 
(b) for each Utah State Senate district, the total of all votes cast in that district for all 
candidates for governor. 
20A-7-202. Statewide initiative process - Application procedures - Time to gather 
signatures - Grounds for rejection, 
(1) Persons wishing to circulate an initiative petition shall file an application with the 
lieutenant governor. 
(2) The application shall contain: 
(a) the name and residence address of at least five sponsors of the initiative petition; 
(b) a statement indicating that each of the sponsors: 
(i) is a resident of Utah; and 
(ii) has voted in a regular general election in Utah within the last three years; 
(c) the signature of each of the sponsors, attested to by a notary public; 
(d) a copy of the proposed law; and 
(e) a statement indicating whether or not persons gathering signatures for the petition may be 
paid for doing so. 
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(3) The application and its contents are public when filed with the lieutenant governor. 
(4) (a) The sponsors shall qualify the petition for the regular general election ballot no later 
than one year after the application is filed. 
(b) If the sponsors fail to qualify the petition for that ballot, the sponsors must: 
(i) submit a new application; 
(ii) obtain new signature sheets; and 
(iii) collect signatures again. 
(5) The lieutenant governor shall reject the application and not issue circulation sheets if: 
(a) the law proposed by the initiative is patently unconstitutional; 
(b) the law proposed by the initiative is nonsensical; 
(c) the proposed law could not become law if passed; or 
(d) the law proposed by the initiative is identical or substantially similar to a law proposed by 
an initiative that was submitted to the county clerks and lieutenant governor for certification and 
evaluation within two years preceding the date on which the application for this initiative was 
filed. 
20A-7-204.1. Public hearings to be held before initiative petitions are circulated, 
(1) (a) Before circulating initiative petitions for signature statewide, sponsors of the initiative 
petition shall hold at least seven public hearings throughout Utah as follows: 
(i) one in the Bear River region - Box Elder, Cache, or Rich County; 
(ii) one in the Southwest region - Beaver, Garfield, Iron, Kane, or Washington County; 
(iii) one in the Mountain region - Summit, Utah, or Wasatch County; 
(iv) one in the Central region - Juab, Millard, Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, or Wayne County; 
(v) one in the Southeast region - Carbon, Emery, Grand, or San Juan County; 
(vi) one in the Uintah Basin region - Daggett, Duchesne, or Uintah County; and 
(vii) one in the Wasatch Front region - Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake, Tooele, or Weber County. 
(b) Of the seven meetings, at least two of the meetings must be held in a first or second class 
county, but not in the same county. 
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(2) At least three calendar days before the date of the public hearing, the sponsors shall: 
(a) provide written notice of the public hearing to: 
(i) the lieutenant governor for posting on the state's website; and 
(ii) each state senator, state representative, and county commission or county council member 
who is elected in whole or in part from the region where the public hearing will be held; and 
(b) publish written notice of the public hearing detailing its time, date, and location in at least 
one newspaper of general circulation in each county in the region where the public hearing will 
be held. 
(3) (a) During the public hearing, the sponsors shall either: 
(i) video tape or audio tape the public hearing and, when the hearing is complete, deposit the 
complete audio or video tape of the meeting with the lieutenant governor; or 
(ii) take comprehensive minutes of the public hearing, detailing the names and titles of each 
speaker and summarizing each speaker's comments. 
(b) The lieutenant governor shall make copies of the tapes or minutes available to the public. 
20A-7-205. Obtaining signatures - Verification - Removal of signature, 
(1) Any Utah voter may sign an initiative petition if the voter is a legal voter. 
(2) The sponsors shall ensure that the person in whose presence each signature sheet was 
signed: 
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency requirements of Section 20A-2-105; and 
(b) verifies each signature sheet by completing the verification printed on the last page of 
each initiative packet. 
(3) (a) (i) Any voter who has signed an initiative petition may have his signature removed 
from the petition by submitting a notarized statement to that effect to the county clerk. 
(ii) In order for the signature to be removed, the statement must be received by the county 
clerk before he delivers the petition to the lieutenant governor. 
(b) Upon receipt of the statement, the county clerk shall remove the signature of the person 
submitting the statement from the initiative petition. 
(c) No one may remove signatures from an initiative petition after the petition is submitted to 
the lieutenant governor. 
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OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 
ELECTIONS DIVISION 
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www elections utah gov 
April 18,2003 
*ve Hutchinson 
>iscopal Diocese 
S300E 
It Lake City, Ut 84111 
ar Steve Hutchinson: 
This letter is to inform you that the proposed initiative entitled "Safe Havens for 
aiming" has been approved for circulation-
Attached please find a copy of the petition packet. It is your responsibility to copy and 
emble the packets so that they meet the requirements of Utah Code 20 A-7-204(4). The 
:kets should then be returned to my office so that they can be numbered. 
Please be aware that SB 28, which makes significant changes to the petition process, 
sed during the last legislative session and will go into effect on May 5, 2003. 
It may be helpftil for you to meet with the State Elections Office and go over the new 
ition requirements. You can reach my office at (801) 538-1041. 
Sincerely, 
Olene S. Walker 
Lieutenant Governor 
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OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR f l , « -v\u 
ELECTIONS DIVISION 
OleneS Walker 115 State Capitol 
Lieutenant Governor Salt Lake City Utah 84114 
* (801)538 1041 
Amy Naccarato (801) 538 1133 FAX 
Director www electrons Utah gov . _ , _ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
May 12, 2003 
Steve Hutchinson 
Episcopal Diocese 
80 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111 
Dear Steve Hutchinson: 
As you may be aware SB 28, which makes significant changes to the petition process, 
went into effect on May 5, 2003. Although your initiative petition application was filed and 
approved for circulation prior to the effective date of this new legislation, some of its provisions 
apply to actions occurring after its effective date. Thus, you must meet the following new 
requirements: 
1. One year limit on signature gathering before submitting initiative tor county clerks. 
You will have until May 5, 2004 to submit your petition. 
2. Signature requirements. Sponsors must have gathered signatures equal to 10% of 
votes cast for governor in 26 of 29 Utah State Senate districts in order for an 
initiative to qualify when it is submitted to the county clerks and Lt. Governor. 
We are in the process of determining the ruiaimum number of signatures which 
must be gathered in each senate district to meet the 10% threshold. We will 
forward this information to you when it is available. 
3. New filing requirements for Political Issues Committees. Please refer to the 
enclosed pamphlet for more information. A report is due on June 2, 2003. 
4. Misconduct of electors. It is unlawful to pay or for a person accept payhient for 
signing or removing a signature from a petition. 
If you have any questions regarding these new requirements, please contact the State 
Elections Office at (801) 5384041. 
Sincerely, 
Olene S. Walker 
Lieutenant Governor 
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